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LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER: ARMED CONFLICT IN LARGER
CONTEXT
Myres S. McDougal*
From what I have heard, and recently read, I gather that there
is a movement to bring together the law of war and the law of
human rights. This article will be directed toward the possible inte-
gration of these two, once allegedly different, dimensions of inher-
ited experience. I propose to try to put the problems of
humanitarian law into a larger context which includes other urgent,
contemporary problems.
My first thought is that it is a mistake to separate humanitarian
law from other parts of the law of war and from international law
and even law, more generally. There was a very famous professor
of constitutional law at Harvard, Thomas Reed Powell, who used to
say: "If you think you can think about something to which some-
thing is attached without thinking about the thing to which it is
attached, then you have a good legal mind." It is this high skill that
is in some measure being applied to the new humanitarian law.
Let me begin with a few brief words about international law in
general and how it is made. It seems to me most fruitful to work
with a conception of international law, as of the law of any commu-
nity, in terms of a process of authoritative decision by which the
members of the community seek to clarify and secure their common
interests. By a community, I mean any group characterized by in-
terdependences, that exhibits interdetermination. In any commu-
nity manifesting interdependences, there is always a process of
effective power in the sense that some decisions are made and en-
forced irrespective of whether or not people like them.
These effective power decisions are of two different kinds: de-
cisions that are made by naked power or sheer convenience, and
decisions that are made from perspectives of authority. The latter
are made by the people who are expected to make them, in accord-
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ance with basic community policies, i.e., through a genuine effort to
clarify community policy, to ascertain and secure common inter-
ests. They are made in structures of authority and by established
procedures, not in smoke-filled rooms. The people who make them
have enough bases in effective power to put them into operation in a
consequential number of instances. These latter decisions we call
law. These are the authoritative decisions in the community.!
These authoritative decisions also are of two different kinds.
There are the decisions that establish this process of authoritative
decision. These may be called constitutive decisions, decisions that
say who the established decision-makers are and what the basic
community policies are, decisions that create structures of author-
ity, allocate bases of power, and specify the procedures that must be
followed for a legal decision to emerge. The decisions that come
out of this constitutive process may be described as public order
decisions. They regulate every value process in the community,
how wealth is shaped and shared, how health is protected, how edu-
cation is fostered and shared, and so on through all the categories of
values that a community may cherish.
Both of these types of decision processes also occur on a global
scale. There is a process of constitutive decision in which interna-
tional law is made and applied and, in measure, an established
world public order. There is a world wealth process in which
claims to wealth get some protection, a world health process, and so
on. One may talk of the protection that nation states, or interna-
tional governmental organizations, or private associations, or indi-
vidual human beings, get as a part of this global public order.
International law is made by a continuing and comprehensive
process of communication which includes all the sources mentioned
in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice2
and much more. The Statute of the International Court of Justice
includes conventions, custom, general principles oflaw, national de-
cisions, and other items, even the opinions of publicists. But this is
not a homogenous categorization, nor is it a comprehensive itemiza-
tion. It makes no reference, for example, to the communications
coming out of international governmental organizations. It makes
no reference to the vast machinery of the United Nations, to the
importance of the resolutions of the General Assembly, or of the
Security Council.
1. See general/y, Lasswell & McDougal, Criteria for a Theory about Law, 44 S.
CAL. L. REV. 362 (1971); McDougal & Reisman, International Law in Policy-Oriented
Perspective, in THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: EssAYS IN
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY, DOCTRINE AND THEORY 103 (R. Macdonald & D. Johnston eds.
1983).
2. Statute of the International Court of Justice. art. 38, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No.
993, 15 U.N.C.LO. Docs. 355 (1945).
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The operating lawyer who sets out to establish what interna-
tionallaw is characteristically follows a certain pattern. He begins
with multilateral agreements, commonly available (as in the law of
war) in abundant variety, and then goes to decisions or utterances
from an international court or an international arbitration, to pre-
scriptions coming out of the General Assembly that purport to say
what international law is, and even to utterances from delegates or
from the secretariat. Ultimately, he moves to the national level, the
general principles of law, comparative constitutional law, national
constitutions, national statutes, national court decisions, and even-
tually to the text writers. The communications he examines are in
huge and continuous flow.
The most appropriate dichotomy is that between law-making
in the most deliberate method and law-making in the least deliber-
ate. The most deliberate method is that of multilateral agreement,
while the least deliberate depends upon the influences people draw
from habitual behavior, sometimes called custom. The traditional,
but inadequate, statement of the requirements for customary law is
that continuing uniformities in behavior must be accompanied by
subjectivities (opinio juris) that they are required by law. The word
custom is also commonly applied to the outcome of this whole pro-
cess of communication, whatever its form or source. Behavior
which at one time is regarded by everybody as unlawful, if repeated
through a period of time, becomes regarded as lawful. There is no
way that one can find out whether there is opinio juris without ob-
serving and evaluating the uniformities in the behavior of people.
One has to observe both the flow of behavior and the flow of words
and only then can one make a realistic conclusion as to whether
there is law and what it is.
The question which should be asked is not what has been the
past customary law and what is the new treaty (protocol) law, and
does the former confirm or aid in interpreting the latter? The rele-
vant question is: what is the law? Are these new protocols law or
will they be law? It is the projection into the future that is impor-
tant. Not all multilateral agreements, however deliberate and how-
ever much in accord or not in accord with customary law, make
law. Many of them are illusions.
In order to make a realistic finding of law, an observer must be
able to identify several very specific components: (1) a policy con-
tent, (2) expectations of authority, and (3) expectations of control.
The policy content of the new protocols, despite many ambiguities,
are as susceptible to clarification as is the policy content of most
multilateral agreements. These protocols have been projected
through the established institutions and procedures of the global
constitutive process of authoritative decision; the agreements have
been made in the way that agreements are expected to be made and
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in a genuine effort to clarify common interest. The expectations of
authority attendant upon the protocols would appear clear. It is the
expectations about control, however, about whether the protocols
are to be put into practice, or are to be allowed to become myth and
illusion, which cause difficulty.
Beyond the expectations of control, one must also be able ulti-
mately to find or create the facts of control, or else the expectations
of control will prove to be illusions. This is a quarrel that I have
with some friends who insist upon the present unlawfulness of
atomic weapons. To say that the use of these weapons is unlawful,
one has to establish not only the policy that the use of these weap-
ons should be unlawful, but that this policy is established by author-
ity and carries expectations of control. This requires the
predispositions and institutions of control on a comprehensive scale.
One way of making a policy into law is for influential people to
assert in a very loud voice that it is law. This approach does not
always work and I am not sure that it will work for the protocols.
International law, like other law, is not made in anyone way or
from anyone source. It is not made by agreements only; nor by
organizational resolutions only; nor by practice only. It is not, most
assuredly, made by text writers saying that a policy is the law. In-
ternationallaw is made by the cumulation of all relevant communi-
cations. That is why we will have to wait to see in what degree
these new protocols become law.
With regard to the application of international law, the great
bulk of application is still from state official to state official.
Although thousands of arbitrations on matters other than military
do occur, most applications of the international law of war continue
to come from nation-state officials. The point that needs emphasis
is that, if one examines the principles comprising what is called in-
ternationallaw, whether relating to the humanitarian law or to any
other problem, these principles always come in complementary
form and multiple policy reference.
In humanitarian law, one has the reference, on the one hand,
to military necessity and, on the other, to humanitarianism. It mat-
ters little whether these complementarities are written into the pre-
scriptions or brought to bear in the application. For, when
combined with the ambiguities and incompletions in the formula-
tion of prescriptions, they give appliers a very broad discretion. The
act of applying is thus a highly creative act: an intervention in the
present to affect the future.
Some critical questions now require our attention: how will
these protocols be applied as law in the future? What are the fac-
tors that will affect that application? How under continuously
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changing conditions can we establish and maintain institutions that
will improve application in the common interest?
With this background on the making and applying of interna-
tionallaw, we must consider the factual problem to which humani-
tarian law is addressed. It seems a mistake to talk and debate about
the virtues and validities of the rules in the protocols, about
whether, in the abstract, they are law or not law. The factual
problems inherent in all the law of war derive from a global process
of coercion, a component of the global process of effective power, a
process that goes on all the time with varying degrees of intensity.
One may describe this process of coercion, as Feliciano and I did,3
in terms of the participants, their objectives, the situations of coer-
cion, the bases of power, the strategies they use and the outcomes in
coercion achieved. There exists law about every feature of this pro-
cess, in all its intensities, from the times that are called peace to the
times that are called war. In fact we live in a continuum of intensi-
ties and this dichotomy of war and peace is no longer descriptive.
The very first problem facing any community, whether global
or regional or local, is the minimization of unauthorized coercion
and violence. From a policy perspective, the very essence of the
notion of law is uniformity in decision. The law is not arbitrary,
nor is it arbitrary coercion. Without this minimum order, this pre-
clusion of unauthorized violence and coercion, there is no chance to
achieve an optimum order to promote the greater production and
wider sharing of the basic values that a community cherishes.
To make sense out of humanitarian law, we need to examine a
more fundamental set of policies than the ones ordinarily an-
nounced in the literature. Ifwe take seriously this policy of minimi-
zation of unauthorized coercion, the concept of minimization has to
be broken down into a number of sub-headings. These topics might
include: the long-term prevention of unauthorized coercion, the
short-term deterrence of intense coercion, the restoration of situa-
tions once violence breaks out, the short-term rehabilitation of vic-
tims, and the longer term reconstruction of communities.
Our principal concern at this conference is the legal regulation
of armed conflict, which requires location in the whole sequence of
problems involved in the law of war. Feliciano and I sought to
specify and organize these problems in terms that would facilitate
performance of all the intellectual tasks that lawyers must perform.4
The first problem is that of prohibiting the use of coercion and vio-
lence against other communities. The United Nations Charter pro-
vides that violence, and the threat of violence, are not to be used
3. See M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER: THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL CoERCION (1961).
4. Id.
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against the territorial integrity or political independence of other
states.s Other articles preserve the historic, and indispensable, right
of self-defense.6 The distinction requires a careful, contextual
evaluation.
A second problem is participation. In a world community
which imposes or assumes a duty of collective responsibility, and in
a context of contending world public orders, there is not likely to be
much room for neutrals. A comparable problem does, however,
arise with respect to assistance to governments or rebels, as in the
Vietnam War. For 300 years it was thought proper and perfectly
lawful for states to go to the aid of established governments, but not
lawful to go to the aid of rebels. This ancient prescription is appar-
ently in the process of change. Contemporary conditions do, there-
fore, raise many difficult problems about permissible participation
in violence.
A third, and most immediately relevant, set of problems is con-
cerned with the conduct of hostilities. This includes all the difficult
sub-problems of permissible combatants, permissible areas of opera-
tion, permissible weapons, permissible victims, and permissible in-
tensities in coercion. Another set of problems includes the intricate
issues raised by belligerant occupation. There is, further, a distinc-
tive problem of captured enemy personnel,7 and other problems
about the permissible treatment of enemy personnel and enemy
property caught within national boundaries, at the outbreak of vio-
lence. Most importantly, there is the problem of legal principles
and procedures for facilitating the termination of violence and
coercion.
I wish to stress that the problems involved in regulating the
conduct of hostilities are intimately related to, and dependent upon,
the policies that relate to all these other problems. We cannot
achieve the deep goals relating to human dignity that we have in
mind in humanitarian law unless at the same time we consider all of
these other problems as well.
Historically, the law of war has worked on three different pol-
icy levels. The first effort is to prevent war and to minimize resort
to unauthorized coercion. States are authorized to use violence
only when it is imminently necessary to defend their territorial in-
tegrity or political independence, or to achieve certain humanitarian
or collective security purposes.8
The second level relates to the conduct of hostilities. When
violence cannot be precluded, it is required that, within the limits of
5. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
6. See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER arts. 51 & 52.
7. See generally B. HINGORANI, PRISONERS OF WAR (1982).
8. See M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 3, 121-260.
HeinOnline -- 3 UCLA Pac. Basin L.J. 27 1984
1984] LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 27
military necessity, the military instrument be employed with as
much humanity as possible.9
A third level relates to reprisals. When one party violates the
law about the conduct of hostilities, then the other ,party is author-
ized also to violate that law in ways that are necessary and propor-
tionate to cause the first party to resume lawful behavior. Io
Through successive retreats, authoritative decision does its best to
approximate humanity. A clear recognition of the interrelations of
these policies and problems might make efforts toward improve-
ment more realistic and, hence, more effective.
Let us now relate all of these problems to another contempo-
rary strand in the development of international law. This approach
may enable us to clarify fundamental policies in greater detail. The
new strand relates to contemporary developments in human rights
law. It is not easy to understand all that is at stake in human rights.
When Professors Lasswell, Chen, and I first began to write a book
on the subject, II we had the problem of defining what we were talk-
ing about. I looked in many previous books and found that human
rights were defined as the rights that law will protect-a very inade-
quate definition, since a legal community might be totalitarian and
woefully wanting in protection.
Another definition came from natural law, which proclaims
that individuals have certain inherent rights derived from various
meta-empirical sources, such as religion or metaphysics. In con-
temporary culture this approach is not very persuasive as it offers
very little guidance in the management of particular empirical
problems. Still another definition came from the historical school
of jurisprudence, which asserts that human rights are whatever the
people demand. Unhappily, again, people may be living in a totali-
tarian community, and have no opportunity to acquire the predis-
position to demand.
The outlines of a more viable conception of human rights came
to me while reading some very technical books upon the European
Convention on Human Rights. 12 This Convention has a lovely pro-
vision against discrimination upon grounds of "sex, race, color, lan-
guage, religion, political or other opinion, national minority,
property, or other status." About the only important ground omit-
ted is old age. The technical books, however, insisted that this right
9. Id. Ch.6.
to. Id.
11. M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD
PUBLIC ORDER: THE BASIC POLICIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN DIG-
NITY (1980).
12. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, in COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS:
COLLECTED TEXTS (9th ed. 1974).
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to non-discrimination was limited to the specific rights set forth
elsewhere in the Convention, and those specific rights were far from
comprehensive. 13 For some reason, wholly distinct from the omis-
sion of old age as a ground of complaint, this highly technical posi-
tion made me angry. For, if a person is entitled to be protected
against differentiation for reasons irrelevant to capabilities, why not
with regard to any value that an enlightened member of the com-
munity might cherish? Professor Harold Lasswell has defined the
value of respect in terms of reciprocal deference between human
beings. 14 It occurred to me that the fullest respect that one human
being can accord another is to respect his freedom of choice, his
autonomy, with regard to participation in any and all of a commu-
nity's value processes.
The most viable conception of the respect value as an indispen-
sable component of human rights, would thus be reciprocal defer-
ence for freedom of choice about participation in every other value
process that a community affords. In a contemporary community
exhibiting inescapable interdependences among all values, such a
conception would alone appear to be rational. Any value that an
individual can achieve is a function of his wealth, enlightenment,
skill, health, and so on. From this perspective, the appropriate des-
ignative reference of "human rights" must be, not merely to legally
protected rights, nor to demanded rights, but to a preferred shaping
and sharing (including the greatest production and widest distribu-
tion) of all cherished values.
When we give human rights this broad reference, as realisti-
cally we must, it becomes obvious that the fundamental policies
about human rights are the same fundamental policies that underlie
all law. The most basic policy in any community that aspires to law
is that of achieving a certain uniformity in decision, a minimum
order that controls unauthorized coercion. Aspiration toward a
more optimum order must include the greater production and wider
sharing of all community values. The distinctive function of the law
of war, as differentiated from any other law, is to clarify and secure
this minimum order and optimum order during times of the most
intense application of coercion.
From this broad definition of the general problem, we may now
be able to focus in more detail upon the particular policies of the
humanitarian law that relate to the conduct of hostilities or combat
operations. When I first read the two new protocols,15 the thought
13. See generally J. FAWCETT, THE ApPLICATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVEN-
TION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1969); F. VALLAT, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF
HUMAN RIGHTS (1972).
14. See Lasswell & McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional
Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203 (1943).
15. Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Convention Relating to the Protection of
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that came to me was that their proponents were trying to reintro-
duce the concept of chivalry. In the wars of the future, if any ob-
servers remain, it may not be possible to distinguish between
combatants and non-combatants. Upon reflection, however, I
remembered that many smaller wars were in process, even now, in
which the protocols might be applied to serve the cause of human
dignity.
The method by which humanitarian law has historically
sought, and still seeks, to distinguish lawfulness from unlawfulness
in the conduct of hostilities has been through a balancing or accom-
modation of military necessity and considerations of humanity.
The Achilles heel in this method is the open-endedness of "military
necessity." Military necessity for what? For taking a position or for
overwhelming an enemy or for winning a war? If military necessity
is related to overwhelming an enemy or winning a war, little role
will be left for considerations of humanity. The classic treatises
upon the law of war do in fact achieve little, by doctrinal formula-
tion, to preserve a role for humanity.
It would of course be naive to hope to dispense with military
necessity, since the concept derives from the present nation-state
organization of the world. The nation-state is a territorial organiza-
tion that came into being about 400 years ago to increase the secur-
ity of the individual human being at a time of great violence and
instability.16 It was, and is, an organization with power as its prin-
cipal goal, the power of a particular people in a specified territorial
area. In an unorganized, chaotic world, people in a specified terri-
torial area cannot maintain their own security without the aid of
this concept of military necessity.
In an effort to impose some limit upon the concept of military
necessity, Feliciano and I suggested recourse to the basic policies
underlying the distinction between self-defense and aggression,17
Under this distinction a state may employ the military instrument
in such measure as is necessary and proportionate to repel attacks
directed against its "territorial integrity" or "political indepen-
dence." We suggest that, by relating any specific exercise of vio-
lence to the permissible objectives of defense of minimum public
order, it might be possible to anchor the search for clarification of
military necessity and stop the infinite regress in the exercise of vio-
lence. Military necessity might then be said to be limited to the
exercise of violence which is indispensably necessary (proportionate
Victims of International Armed Conflicts, U.N. Doc. A/32/144, Annex I 1977, re-
printed in 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977); Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of International Armed Conflicts, U.N. Doc. A/32/144, An-
nex II (1977), reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977).
16. See J. STRAYER, ON THE MEDIEVAL ORIGINS OF THE MODERN STATE (1970).
17. See M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 3, Ch. 3.
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and relevant) to promptly repelling and terminating highly intense
coercion against "territorial integrity" and "political
independence."
This is not to suggest that aggressors be denied the benefits of
the law of war, or that their every act of violence be treated as a war
crime. It is urged only that the standard applied be the same re-
strictive one appropriate to permissible self-defense. It may be re-
called that Quincy Wright took the view, shortly after the United
Nations Charter became effective, that aggressive states should not
have the benefits of the laws of war. It was not long, however,
before most observers saw a common interest for all humankind in
applying the laws of war in any kind of major conflict or massive
destruction. This same policy should apply to wars of so-called lib-
eration. There is a common interest in having the laws of war ap-
plied in any process of intense coercion or violence.
To give meaning to the policy complementary to military ne-
cessity, that of "humanity," we must consider the immense develop-
ment of human rights law since 1945. A growing number of writers
have noted how well established human rights law is today, and
have observed the need to integrate that law with a new "humanita-
rian" law of war. Professors Lasswell, Chen, and I took the posi-
tion that we have today a global bill of rights which is fully
comparable to that in our mature national communities. IS A bill of
rights refers to the most intensely demanded policies in a commu-
nity. Its policies are prescribed in a specialized way and are made
applicable to everybody. Provision is made for their invocation
against all violators, and they can be terminated only in the same
way they are made.
It is said all over the world today that the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights,19 despite its origin in aspiration only, has
become customary international law. More precisely, it is not the
Universal Declaration alone, but the Universal Declaration in the
whole global flow of communication-the United Nations Charter,
the two basic covenants, the ancillary covenants, the regional cove-
nants, the national constitutions, national legislation and decisions,
writing of publicists and so on-that have created a global bill of
human rights. It is this vast body of newly established law, not
simply preference or pious aspirations, that can now be drawn upon
to fill in the outlines of what is meant by humanity.
I have already made reference to the problem of prohibiting
unauthorized violence. The aggressor is the state which first puts
another state upon notice, upon reasonable belief, that it must use
18. See M. McDoUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, supra note II, Ch. 4.
19. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/81O, at
71 (1948).
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the military instrument to protect its political independence or terri-
torial integrity. The state so put upon notice is entitled to claim the
benefits of self-defense. This may be ambiguous, but no more so
than many other legal prescriptions. It is true that one has to make
a close, careful, contextual examination of every particular instance
to find out who is aggressor and who is self-defender. Such contex-
tual examination is, however, required in almost any legal problem
of any importance. The trouble with a prescription that there shall
be no aggressive use of the nuclear weapon is that it assumes that
one knows who is the aggressor. There is, unhappily, no way of
finding out who the aggressor is without this very careful examina-
tion. An added difficulty is that we have no authoritative body to
make such a determination. With the veto in the United Nations
Security Council, the world affords no effective institutions.
It is common knowledge that over the centuries, humankind
has enjoyed no great success either in precluding the outbreak of
violence or in regulating the conduct of hostilities to secure con-
formity to humane criteria. Even in recent decades we have been
much more successful in achieving prescriptions in accord with the
requirements of human dignity than in securing their application in
practice. Any of us who read the papers or listen to the radio know
that not all contemporary wars are fought in accordance with the
two new protocols20 or the '49 conventions21 or the older laws of
war. Within the last two hundred years the protection during times
of relative peace of individual human rights has increased greatly in
many parts of the world; yet the values we cherish as essential to
human dignity are even today poorly protected on a global scale,
and sometimes even in our own country. The task remains of in-
creasing such protection throughout the cycle of peace and war.
Turning to the factors that condition our failure, we are con-
fronted with all the features of the contemporary global process of
effective power. In a world organized primarily through the territo-
rial community of the nation-state, an entity designed to preserve
and increase its own power at the expense of all other such entities,
the world arena is inescapably a military arena. The dangers inher-
ent in a comprehensive military arena are, further, immeasurably
increased by a developing weapons technology and made immediate
by technologies of communications and transportation. All these
developments are perhaps making the nation-state as obsolete as
gun-powder once made the walled city. What we have today is a
global organization, or disorganization, not so much of 200 nation-
20. Protocols Additional to the Geneva Convention, supra note 15.
21. Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S.
3362; 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. 3363; 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. 3364; 6 U.S.T. 3516,
T.I.A.S. 3365 (1949).
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states, as of two contending ideological public orders, one totalitar-
ian and the other hopefully aspiring toward freedom, each trying to
eliminate the other. Certainly we can observe at least two immense
giants, armed with the new weapons and spurred on by a danger of
proliferation, circling the globe with satellites, airplanes, and sub-
marines and spying upon each other's every move, in expectation of
instant retaliation. The outcome is a tremendous insecurity for
every person on the globe.
The one heartening condition is the increasing recognition by
the peoples of the world, despite their divisions into East and West
and North and South, of their inescapable interdependences, not
merely in the shaping and sharing of all cherished values, but even
in simple survival. One of the most potent political forces of global
reach today is the rising common demand of peoples, wherever situ-
ated, for greater participation in the shaping and sharing of all val-
ues and for the establishment and maintenance of institutions which
will afford them security in the enjoyment of such values.
If we attempt to project future developments, we are con-
fronted by all the changing features of the global community pro-
cess, including that of effective power. We cannot indulge in
simple-minded extrapolations of past trends, since, through the in-
ventiveness of man, conditions are always changing. The new ac-
cess to space, by way of the shuttle and other inventions still to
come, may be expected to change vastly not only future life, but
future war, in as yet unimaginable ways. It may be reasonable,
however, to anticipate a continuing aggravation of the struggle be-
tween contending ideological world public orders until one or the
other gets the upper hand, or they merge into each other. We can
hope that the increasing recognition of the peoples of the world of
their interdependences and rational employment of the new tech-
nology, will create in the larger earth-space community a new
global community rather than a theatre for suicidal combat.
The alternatives for those who seek a more safe, abundant, and
free world public order all focus upon communication and persua-
sion. Theoretically, one might change any and every feature of the
global constitutive process of authoritative decision, the process by
which international or transnational law is made and applied, in the
effort to improve the protection of individual human rights
throughout the continuum of war and peace. Practically, any
change must require the consent, even the active initiative, of all
holders of effective power. This consent and initiative can scarcely
be obtained without tremendous programs in communication and
education. The peoples of the world need to be educated to a
deeper understanding of the problems involved and of the potential-
ities of law for the solution of such problems. They need to be edu-
cated to a more realistic understanding of their interdependences
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with regard to all values, even survival, and to the imperative neces-
sity for wider and wider identifications with their fellow human
beings.
In our book on human rights my colleagues and I noted22 that
"the contemporary image of man as capable of respecting himself
and others, and of constructively participating in the shaping and
sharing of all human dignity values, is the culmination of many dif-
ferent trends in thought, secular as well as religious, with origins
extending far back into antiquity and coming down through the
centuries with vast cultural and geographic reach." It is our oppor-
tunity to preserve and extend this image and its realization in fact.
22. M. McDoUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, supra note II, at 376.
